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SEEING IS BELIEVING:1
A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
DEMONSTRATIVE COMPUTER EVIDENCE
“If we leap off the technological cliff without looking, we shouldn’t
be surprised by an occasional splat.”2
KAREN D. BUTERA3
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I. INTRODUCTION
The expert raised his right hand, affirmed his oath to tell the truth and nothing but
the truth, and took his place in the witness box.4 Sitting, he took a deep breath,
1

Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 4, 1994). The court recited this adage in concluding that the jury might give undue
weight to a computer simulation.
2
Fredric Lederer, Is Technology Changing Civil Justice?, TRIAL, March 1998, at 40, 42.
Professor Lederer is Chancellor Professor of Law at William and Mary Law School in
Williamsburg, Virginia. Id. at 40. He is also the director of the Courtroom 21 Project, which
provides both a demonstration center for state-of-the art courtroom technology and a research
center that examines the impact of technology on the justice system. Id.
3

A.S. in Computer Technology, Kent State University; B.A. in Management, Malone
College; J.D., University of Akron School of Law. Previously to attending law school, Ms.
Butera was a data processing professional for over 16 years. Ms. Butera is currently an
associate with Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs in Canton, Ohio. The author would like to
thank her family, friends, and children for their support during her efforts to complete this
project.
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knowing the questions were about to begin. The prosecutor began questioning the
expert regarding the disaster. The expert answered the questions patiently,
methodically, calmly. Yes, the boat was at sea. Yes, the night was dark. Yes,
lookout was made, but the lookout failed to perceive the danger. Yes, the boat ran
into the unidentified object, and sustained damage. Yes, due to the complex laws of
both physics and physiology, the normal human eye would have been unable to spot
the danger in time to avoid it. Yes, many people died in the aftermath. No, based
upon my knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education, my opinion to a
reasonable degree of scientific certainty is that the accident was caused by the forces
of nature coupled with simple carelessness.
The expert looked at the jury box. It had been a long, drawn-out trial, as criminal
trials of this type usually are. The jury looked tired, dazed and sleepy. The expert
knew his testimony was important to this case, and wondered what he could do to
convey to the nodding jury the impact of the events as they actually occurred.
This may be fiction, but the above scenario may be probable today in a trial to
determine criminal liability for a Titanic-type disaster.5 Ah, yes, the Titanic . . . the
name alone imparts to the reader the scale and depth of the victims’ misery and
death.6 Yet, the words this expert may have spoken, even though quite factual,
barely convey to the reader and the fictitious jury the depth and extent of the actual
events. Imagine in this same fictional trial if the expert could have used computer
simulations to demonstrate his testimony. The reasonableness and coincidental
nature of the actual events would have been visualized within the minds of the jury.7
With the invention of television and the development of computerization our
society and our juries have become much more visually oriented.8 As computer
equipment itself becomes more financially accessible, more experts are using
computer simulations as demonstrative evidence during their trial testimony.
However, this use of computer simulations presents several novel, complex issues.
Which evidence rules are applicable during expert testimony accompanied by
demonstrative computer simulation? Are our experts, attorneys and/or judges
sufficiently knowledgeable to effectively handle this demonstrative evidence? Is the
use of demonstrative computer simulations unduly influential to the jury and
4

The story of the trial is fictional, and used for illustrative purposes only.

5

The Titanic was the largest and most expensive passenger ship built during its time. Jim
Sadur, Titanic: Facts & Figures, (March 27, 1998) <http://www.intercall.net/
~jsadur/titanic/facts.html>. It was built to be unsinkable. Id. However, on her maiden voyage
two days out of port, the liner hit an iceberg and within a few hours completely sank. Id.
6

The Titanic held 2,228 people on board, but only had lifeboat capacity for 1,178 people.
Id. It sank in 12,500 feet of water, approximately 375 miles southeast of Newfoundland.
Approximately 1,523 perished in the tragedy, most from exposure. Id.
7

Adam T. Berkoff, Computer Simulations in Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors
Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 829, 829 (1994). Once the jurors see the simulation, “the
images will be graven on their minds.” Id.
8
Id. See also THOMAS A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 139 (4th ed. 1996). “A whole
generation of Americans has been raised and educated primarily by seeing. Children learn by
watching TV . . . .” Id. For a practical discussion of the use of computer technology to prepare
for trial, see William S. Bailey, Using Computer Technology to Prepare For Trial, TRIAL,
Apr. 1998, at 44.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/7

2

1998]

SEEING IS BELIEVING

513

prejudicial to the opposing party? Is there a backlash against the over-use of
technology by segments of our society?
These and many other issues are considered, resulting in this practical tool to be
used in admitting demonstrative computer evidence. Part II will explore the
backgrounds of demonstrative evidence, computerization, and the use of computer
simulation for demonstrative evidence.9 Part III will discuss and analyze several
relevant issues, including attorney training, expert knowledge, judicial confusion,
additional evidentiary issues, and the possible prejudicial influence of demonstrative
computer simulations.10 This discussion concludes with some general thoughts
regarding the use of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert
testimony.11
II. BACKGROUND
A. General Background of Demonstrative Evidence
Information which is presented to us is absorbed by us primarily through sight.12
Research shows that the use of visual aids to assist with an oral presentation can
facilitate comprehension, increase understanding and retention levels by as much as
sixty-five percent.13 Additionally, information which is perceived by the individual
from a variety of methods (aural, visual, and written) is retained and understood at a
substantially higher level.14
Demonstrative evidence uses models, charts, diagrams or actual demonstrations
to clarify or explain other relevant, substantive evidence introduced at trial.15
Demonstrative evidence has been included in the American trial process for well
9

See infra Part II.A-B.

10

See infra Part III.A-E.

11

See infra Part IV.

12

Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 1101, 1114
(1993).
13
Id. “[A] witness’s oral testimony can be absolutely boring and by this time a juror has
stopped paying full attention. It should come as no surprise that as much as ninety percent of
verbal testimony is misunderstood or forgotten completely.” Id., quoting Theodore D.
Ciccone, President of Litigation Communications, Inc.
14

See also MAUET, supra note 8, at 139. “A study entitled the ‘Weiss-McGrath Report’
found a 100 percent increase in juror retention of visual over oral presentations and a 650
percent increase in juror retention of combined visual and oral presentations over oral
presentations alone.” Mary C. Kelly & Jack N. Bernstein, Virtual Reality: The Reality of
Getting It Admitted, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 145, n.39 (1994), quoting Roy
Krieger, Now Showing at a Courtroom Near You . . .; Sophisticated Computer Graphics Come
of Age - and Evidence Will Never Be the Same, ABA J., Dec. 1992, at 93.
15

Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative
Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 959 (1992).
Mueller and Kirkpatrick have determined three different definitions for demonstrative
evidence: 1) anything that appeals to the senses, 2) firsthand sense impression, and 3)
illustrative evidence. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE 117980 (1995).
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over 100 years.16 However, it was during the 1950’s, that trial attorneys like Melvin
Belli “championed vivid, dramatic models or charts to persuade jurors.”17 Since that
time, an increasing number of both civil and criminal trials have contained the use of
demonstrative evidence.18
Unlike substantive evidence, demonstrative evidence can only illustrate or
explain other testimonial, documentary or real evidence.19 It cannot independently
prove a fact and is usually prepared uniquely for litigation.20 Demonstrative
evidence may be formally admitted21 and included in the record on appeal.22 During
deliberations, the jury is usually permitted access only to exhibits formally admitted
into evidence.23
The foundational requirements for admissibility of evidence differ based upon
jurisdictions. The focus of this discussion is based upon the application of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. However, many states, including Ohio, have based their
own state rules upon the Federal Rules, and many of the considerations and
arguments found in this practical guide can be adopted for use in other jurisdictions.
Additionally, as demonstrative computer evidence is an emerging issue for trial
practitioners, all practitioners, regardless of jurisdictional rules, can glean insight
from discussions contained in this guide.
The foundational requirements for admissibility of demonstrative evidence are
different from those requirements for substantive evidence.24 The foundational
requirements focus on whether the demonstrative evidence can accurately and
helpfully explain the other related evidence.25 To establish a foundation for
admission of demonstrative evidence, the following requirements must be met:

16

Brain & Broderick, supra note 15, at 959.

17

Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, Demonstrative Evidence: The Next Generation,
17 No. 4 LITIGATION 21 (1991). Belli threw a prosthetic leg at a jury in 1946, and told each
juror to “feel the warm blood coursing through the veins.” Brain & Broderick, supra note 15,
at 998. See also Melvin Belli, Demonstrative Evidence: Seeing is Believing, TRIAL, July 1980,
at 70.
18

Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 21.

19

Id.

20

Brain & Broderick, supra note 15, at 971.

21

MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1183.

22

Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23.

23

United States v. Abbas, 504 F.2d 123, 125 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cox, 633
F.2d 871, 874 n.9 (9th Cir. 1980); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 430-32 (5th
Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316,1329 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Downen, 496 F.2d 314, 320-21 (10th Cir. 1974).
24

Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23. Substantive evidence may be admitted if it
tends to prove the apparent existence or nonexistence of a relevant fact, therefore being
primary relevance. FED. R. EVID. 401. See generally, George F. James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689 (1941).
25

Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 23.
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1.

The demonstrative exhibit relates to other relevant, competent, and
material testimonial, documentary, or real evidence;26
2.
The witness whose testimony the demonstrative exhibit illustrates is
familiar with the exhibit;27
3.
The demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately reflects the other
evidence to which it relates;28 and
4.
The demonstrative evidence will aid the trier of fact in understanding
or evaluating the other related evidence.29
Additionally, demonstrative evidence must still meet the general evidentiary rules
which apply to all evidence.30
B.

General Background of Demonstrative Computer Simulation

The federal government lead the way into the computer age.31 During World
War II, the Army funded development of a computer to calculate artillery
trajectories.32 Following the Army’s construction of ENIAC, advances and use of
computerization began to rapidly evolve, with several new machines being built.33
In 1947, physicists at Bell Laboratories invented transistors, which performed the
functions of vacuum tubes.34 The transistors were smaller, reliable and consumed
much less power than vacuum tubes.35 In the late 1960’s and 1970’s, the next
advances in computer technology arrived.36 Silicon computer chips replaced

26

FED. R. EVID. 401; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1181. See generally
Elwyn L. Cady, Jr., Objections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 MO. L. REV. 333 (1967); Craig
Spangenberg, The Use of Demonstrative Evidence, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 178 (1960).
27

FED. R. EVID. 602, 703; Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 24.

28

FED. R. EVID. 401; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1182. James
McElhaney describes the phrase “fair and accurate” as “magic words” in the introduction of
demonstrative evidence. JAMES W. McELHANEY, McELHANEY’S TRIAL NOTEBOOK 561 (3d
ed., 1994).
29
FED. R. EVID. 401 & 403; MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 15, at 1183; Harvey by
Harvey v. General Motors Corp, 873 F.2d 1343, 1355 (10th Cir. 1989); Campbell v. Pitt
County Memorial Hosp., Inc., 352 S.E.2d 902, 905-06 (N.C. App. 1987).
30

See infra Part III.A-E.

31

Sandra Sanders, Arizona's Public Records Laws and the Technology Age: Applying
"Paper" Laws to Computer Records, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 932 (1995).
32
Id. That computer was called ENIAC (Electronic Numerical Integrator and Calculator).
Lee Loevinger, The Invention and Future of the Computer, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 21, 26 (1996). It had to be manually wired to execute each program as it had no
storage memory. Id. The computer was 15,000 square feet in size, weighed thirty tons,
contained 6,000 switches and 17,468 vacuum tubes. Id.
33

Id. at 29.

34

Id.

35

Id. Transistors took ten years of experimentation and development before they were
ready for commercial use. Id.
36

Id.
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transistors as the heart of the computer equipment.37 In the 1980’s, very large scale
integration (VLSI) increased the density of computer chips.38 By 1995, a single
computer chip replaced more than five million transistors.39
The rapid acceleration in the advancement of computer chip technology is the
heart of the advancement in the use of technology in our modern age.40 Our modern
use of technology has greatly increased, as the computer chips become faster, lighter,
smaller, more reliable, less power consuming, and more efficient.41 Where ENIAC
was used to compute trajectories, computer chips now talk to us in our cars and in
our pockets.42
When individuals think of the word “computer,” many envision an electronic
marvel with magical powers.43 In reality, the capabilities of the computer are quite
limited, as a computer has no independent intelligence.44 Computers derive most of
their amazing power from three features: speed, accuracy, and memory.45 The
accuracy of computers is due partially to the inherent reliability of the electronic
circuits that make up a computer system.46 The consistency of the computergenerated results is known as the accuracy of the system.47
However, computer accuracy only relates to the internal processing of the
system. If either the computer instructions or the information fed into the computer
are inaccurate, the end result of the computer processing will be incorrect.48 This
phenomenon, known as “Garbage in - Garbage out” (GIGO), is fundamental to
understanding computer accuracy.49
37

Loevinger, supra note 32, at 29.

38

Id.

39

Id.

40

Id. at 30.

41

Id. Nicolas Negroponte, Professor of Media Technology at MIT wrote: “[c]omputing is
not about computers any more. It is about living . . . We have seen computers move out of
giant airconditioned rooms into closets, then onto desktops, and now into our laps and pockets.
But this is not the end.” NICHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEING DIGITAL 229, 231 (1995), as quoted
in Lee Loevinger, The Invention and Future of the Computer, 15 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER
& INFO. L. 21, 30 (1996).
42

The microprocessor is the foundation of the current American economy, and American
industry spends more now on computers and related equipment than on all other capital
equipment combined. Loevinger, supra note 32, at 33.
43

STEVEN L. MANDELL, COMPUTERS AND DATA PROCESSING: CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS
6 (1979).
44

Id.

45

Id. at 6. Computer speeds are measured in nanoseconds, or one-billionth of a second.

Id.
46

Id. at 7.

47

Id. at 7. MANDELL, supra note 43, at 7.

48

Id.

49

Id.
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Computer simulation can take several forms. The first form is known as
computer animation. Computer animation is very similar to commercial animation,
in that an artistic image is altered frame by frame in order to show actual
movement.50 The artistic computer rendering is then recorded in rapid succession
onto a videotape to create the illusion of movement.51 Computer animation is
produced by collecting all information possible, loading it into the computer system,
deciding on the animation features of the presentation, rendering the still frames, and
finally recording the still frames onto videotape.52 It is important to note that
computer animations are strictly artists’ renditions, and are not limited by any
physical laws.53
By contrast, computer reconstructions, also known as computer simulations,54 are
computer animations grounded in the laws of physics and science.55 To produce a
reconstruction, the initial step begins with the inputting of the three-dimensional
coordinates of the objects that were present at the scene.56 Then the motions of each
object involved in the incident are calculated.57 The laws of science provide the rules
by which the objects move, and this movement is compared with the testimony and
observances of eyewitnesses.58 The computerized results can then be recorded on
videotape for production during the trial.59
There are several situations in which the use of computer simulations can be very
valuable. First, the computer simulation can be valuable if the visualization of the
event or an object is complicated by the dynamics of the situation.60 Second, if “real50

Berkoff, supra note 7, at 830.

51

Jennifer Robinson Boyle, State v. Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the
Future and Allow Computer Animations in Criminal Trials, 9 NOVA L. REV. 371, 375 (1994).
This is similar to how Saturday morning cartoon favorites are produced. Using Computer
Animation in the Courtroom, PROSECUTOR, October 1995, at 19.
52

Boyle, supra note 51, at 375-76.

53

Using Computer Animation, supra note 51, at 20.

54

It is important to note that commentators and courts use some terms interchangeably.
Therefore, when faced with computer produced evidence, it is important to ascertain the true
basis for the computer production. See infra Part III.A and D.
55

Using Computer Animation, supra note 51, at 20.

56

Berkoff, supra note 7, at 831.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. In some jurisdictions, the attorneys can now take the computers into the courtroom
and using an overhead projector, “play” the computer reconstruction for the jury.
Virtual reality could be considered another type of computer simulation. It is similar to
computer reconstructions; however, the viewer (juror) wears a helmet and possibly other
items, and can individually “see,” “sense,” and investigate the incident scene. Due to the
special evidentiary issues which arise with active juror participation, virtual reality will not be
included in the scope of this comment. See generally Mary C. Kelly & Jack N. Bernstein,
Virtual Reality: The Reality of Getting It Admitted, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
145 (1994).
60

Berkoff, supra note 7, at 832.
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time” of the incident is a crucial factor, the computer simulation can be most
helpful.61 Third, the computer simulation can recreate an event where physical
recreation would be impracticable due to expense or danger.62 A computer
simulation can be very valuable to explain or clarify a complex situation being
explained by an expert to the jury.63 Finally, computer simulation is able to show
multiple, three-dimensional views of the incident.64
One of the most significant cases laying the groundwork for the admissibility of
computer simulations is Perma Research and Development v. Singer Co.65 Here,
Perma had assigned a patent to Singer to perfect, manufacture, and market an antiskid braking device for automobiles.66 Perma brought action against Singer for a
breach of a contractual obligation to use its best efforts in fulfillment of the
contract.67 Singer defended on the grounds that the device was not perfectible.68
Perma was permitted to present expert testimony with computer simulations
indicating that the anti-skid device was perfectible.69 The end result was an award of
nearly seven million dollars in damages for Perma.70
Another famous civil action using demonstrative computer simulation was a
massive hexane explosion in the Louisville, Kentucky sewer system.71 A chemical
engineer had determined that liability ran to the Ralston Purina plant; the problem
was that it took the engineer “days to explain his theory.”72 The expert’s conclusions
were reduced to a 12-minute segment of computer animation.73 Immediately after
viewing the videotape, Ralston Purina settled for more than $65 million.74
Other types of civil cases have jumped onto the computer simulation bandwagon.
Those types of cases include medical malpractice,75 fraud,76 auto accident,77 product

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976). See also Elaine M. Chaney, Computer Simulations: How
They Can Be Used At Trial and The Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV. 735, 736
(1986).
66

Perma, 542 F.2d at 113.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.

71

Mark Barrish, Disclosure of Computer Re-Enactments During Pretrial Discovery, 16
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L. J. 691, 697 (1994).
72

Id.

73

Id.

74

Id.

75

For detailed discussion, see Andre M. Thapedi, A.D.A.M. - The Computer Generated
Cadaver: A New Development in Medical Malpractice and Personal Injury Litigation, 13 J.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss3/7

8

1998]

SEEING IS BELIEVING

519

liability,78 and nuclear plant accidents.79 Additionally, quasi-civil actions have also
involved the use of computer simulation.80
Due to constitutional considerations, demonstrative computer simulations used
during criminal trials developed at a slower, more cautious rate. In 1984, a New
York court became the first court to allow the introductions of a computer animation
in a criminal trial.81 Courts across the country were slow to allow for the
introduction of the demonstrative computer evidence. In 1992, California permitted
a computer simulation to be used in a murder prosecution.82 In 1995, an Ohio court

MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. 313 (1995). A.D.A.M. is a “computer generated cadaver
that permits the user to peel away several layers of the human body.” Id.
76
In Delzer v. United Bank of Bismarck, 559 N.W.2d 531 (N.D. 1997), the Delzers brought
action against the bank for deceit and breach of contract to loan money. Id. at 532. Plaintiff’s
experts used a computer model to explain their theory of what would have happened if the
Bank had loaned the money it had promised. Id. at 537.
77

Sallis v. Lamansky, 420 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1988).

78

Arnold v. Riddell, Inc., 882 F. Supp. 979 (D. Kansas 1995). The Arnolds are the
parents of a high school football player who suffered a severe neck injury. Id. at 986. They
brought suit against the defendant manufacturer of the football helmet. Id.
79

Arising out of the infamous incident known as Three Mile Island, In re TMI Litigation
Consolidated Proceedings, 927 F. Supp. 834 (M.D. Pa. 1996).
80
State v. Louis Trauth Dairy, Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1247 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (antitrust). See
also Robert J. Gross, Ten Practice Tips for Dealing with the U.S. Government in Aviation Tort
Litigation, 12 FALL AIR & SPACE LAW 1 (1997); Dwight H. Merriam, Dealing with Citizen
Opposition: A Dozen Do's and Don'ts for Development Denizens, SC10 ALI-ABA 517 (1997)
(land use planning, regulation, and litigation); Robert H. Lande, From the Surrogates to
Stories, The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11 SPG ANTITRUST (1997); Mark W.
Frankena & John R. Morris, Why Applicants Should Use Computer Simulation Models to
Comply with the FERC’S New Merger Policy, 135 No. 3 PUB. UTIL. FORT 22 (1997).
81
People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. 1984). McHugh involved a vehicular
homicide, and the animation depicted the motion of a car, not of a person. Id. The defendant
was charged with both intoxication and speeding. However, the defendant denied both,
claiming that the accident occurred when bad weather forced his car to swerve off the road and
hit a road hazard. Id. The defendant attempted to demonstrate his theory by computer
animation. Id. After discussion, the court concluded that the computer animation was
admissible, that it was not scientific evidence, but analogous to a simple chart or diagram. Id.
at 722. In an oft-quoted remark, the court stated:
A computer is not a gimmick and the court should not be shy about its use, when
proper. Computers are simply mechanical tools - receiving information and acting on
instructions at lightning speed. When the results are useful, they should be accepted,
when confusing, they should be rejected. What is important is that the presentation be
relevant to a possible defense, that it fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony
offered and that it be an aid to the jury’s understanding of the issue.
McHugh, 476 N.Y.S. 2d at 722-23.
82

People v. Mitchell, Marin County Superior Court No. SC-12462-A (Cal. App. First Dist.
Div. 2 1994). James Mitchell claimed he shot his brother Artie in self-defense. The
prosecution used animated reconstruction of the events based on physical evidence gathered at
the crime scene. Id. at 11.
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permitted the use of computer reconstruction to disprove the defendant’s theory of
the murder case.83
A most recent use of computer reconstruction occurred in the case of Pierce v.
State.84 Using computer reconstruction, Pierce was convicted of vehicular homicide
and sentenced to sixty years.85 Defense counsel objected to the prosecution’s use of
a three-minute computer reconstruction of the accident, and appealed.86 The
appellate court, quoting McHugh, permitted the use of the computer simulation, as
long as counsel “established proper ground work and qualified the expert.”87
III. ISSUES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. The Attorneys
As with the growth and advancement of technology, computer simulations to
demonstrate expert testimony will continue to be an increasingly common sight in
courtrooms. In the mid-1980’s, a typical computer reconstruction cost $100,000 or
more.88 In 1989, the same simulation cost about $30,000 to $60,000 to produce.89 In
1993, the cost for the same simulation was $4,000 to $8,000.90
As with any critical part of the litigation process, the attorney would be well
advised to consider the local jurisdictional nuances and rules regarding the use of
computer simulation.91 Time investment prior to the trial is preferable to the “risk of
incurring the [c]ourt’s wrath and having one’s carefully planned high tech show
derailed.”92

83

State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995). Clark claimed that the death was
an accident, but the computer reconstruction showed differently. Id. at 810. See Kristin L.
Fulcher, The Jury as Witness: Forensic Computer Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of
the Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 55 (1996). But see Cornell v. State,
463 S.E.2d 702 (Ga. 1995) (defendant not permitted to introduce a reconstruction of a crime
scene as evidence, as lacking adequate foundation).
84

Pierce v. State, 671 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1996).

85

Id. at 187. Pierce hit three children with his truck, killing one of them. Id.

86

Id.

87
Id. at 190. For a detailed discussion of Pierce, see Jennifer Robinson Boyle, State v.
Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow Computer Animations in
Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371 (1994).
88

Daniel Tynan, Evidence in Motion, 13-Oct CAL LAW 85, 85 (1993).

89

Id.

90

Id. A review of any litigation based publication will include advertisements for computer
software which will produce computer simulations for the attorney.
91

MAUET, supra note 8, at 167.

92

David Siegel & Brian Pass, High Technology at Trial: Use It or Lose It, 444 PLI/LIT
605, 624 (1992). The contra is also possible . . . not preparing a computer simulation upon the
false assumption that the court would exclude it.
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An effective attorney will have an understanding of data processing and
computer modeling concepts.93 This will allow the attorney to make an initial
investigation and develop an understanding of the true materiality of the computer
simulation.94 “Where the computer is involved, the advocate’s ability to effectively
detect and present facts and to control the uncertainty associated with those facts will
depend . . . on his understanding of the data processing environment.”95
Only a knowledgeable advocate will be able to make effective use of “the oldest
and most venerable tradition available to the attorney, the art of cross-examining the
expert.”96 The modeling expert must be made to “defend the procedures used in all
steps of the modeling process.”97
Using effective cross-examination, the
knowledgeable advocate can convey to both the judge and jury the unreliability of a
poorly executed demonstrative computer simulation.98 If the model is speculative,
the effective and knowledgeable advocate can reveal this substantial defect to the
factfinder.99 If the computer simulation’s underpinnings are weak, the advocate can
reveal this to the jury by thoroughly questioning the expert, stripping him of his
expert “jargon” and requiring him to answer the cross-examination in explicit
terms.100
In criminal trials, the U.S. Constitution guarantees the criminal defendant the
right to effective assistance of counsel.101 In Strickland v. Washington,102 the
Supreme Court adopted a two-prong test103 which evaluates counsel’s performance
against the actions of an objective reasonably competent lawyer under the
circumstances based upon the prevailing professional norms and circumstances.104
Although this standard applies both during discovery and at trial, currently no case
93
Craig Murphy, Computer Simulations and Video Re-Enactments: Fact, Fantasy and
Admission Standards, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 145, 158 (1990). This is especially significant
considering that many advocates have a non-scientific or technical background. One
commentator predicts that we may well be headed towards a stratified society—one class of
sophisticated technological aristocrats, who are able to use and command the complex
technologies, and a “much larger class of plebeians who still have trouble programming their
VCRs.” Loevinger, supra note 32, at 35-36.
94

Id.

95

Id.

96
Itzchak E. Kornfeld, A Postscript on Groundwater Modelling: Daubert, “Good
Grounds,” and the Central Role of Cross-Examination, 29 TORT. & INS. L. J. 646, 648 (1994).
97

Id.

98

Id.

99

Id. at 648-49.

100

Id.

101

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

102

466 U.S. 668 (1984).

103

The defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, and that the
deficient performance was so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial that reached a
reliable result. Id.
104

Id.
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has found that that defense counsel’s failure to seek discovery of computerized
information resulted in a constitutional violation.105 However, as defense attorneys
and the judiciary become more technically literate and request this information
during discovery and/or trial, the prevailing norms considered under a Strickland test
will shift to include computer simulation information.106 Thus, even the minimally
competent attorney will be required to consider and evaluate demonstrative computer
simulations.107
B. The Experts Themselves
Prior to evaluating the admissibility of the demonstrative computer simulation,
the court evaluates the admissibility of the expert’s testimony.108 If the expert
testimony is inadmissible, then the computer simulation which would demonstrate
the expert’s opinion would also be inadmissible.109 However, even if the expert
testimony is admissible, prior to its viewing by the jury the demonstrative computer
simulation must receive independent scrutiny.110
In addition to the substantive expert, the demonstrative computer simulation may
require the testimony of the expert who actually produced the simulation.111 The
computer expert would still have to be qualified concerning his expertise in the
subject matter of his testimony. The testimony of the computer expert should cover:
1) the expert’s knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in programming
and operating computers;112 2) the instructions the expert received for creating the
program;113 3) the data the expert entered into the computer, the source for such data,
and validation performed on the information;114 4) the steps taken to ensure that the

105
Robert Garcia, “Garbage In, Gospel Out”: Criminal Discovery, Computer Reliability,
and The Constitution, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1043, 1141 (1991).
106

Id. at 1142.

107

Id.

108

FED. R. EVID. 104(a).

109

Edward A. Hannon, Computer-Generated Evidence: Testing the Envelope, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 353, 359-60 (1996). Therefore, qualification of the expert is a critical step, and
would be performed according to FED. R. EVID. 702. Depending on the type of testimony the
expert is expected to produce and the jurisdictional rules that apply, either the Frye, Daubert,
or combination (Williams/Downing) test would be used.
110

Hannon, supra note 109, at 259-60. See infra Part III.D for a detailed discussion
regarding the foundational requirements for admissibility of the demonstrative computer
simulation.
111

Robert M. Pozin, Sophisticated Models and In-Court Demonstrations, 15 SPG BRIEF
43, 45 (1986). If the substantive expert relied on commercially available and tested software,
in some jurisdictions the computer expert’s testimony may be partially replaced by judicial
notice. Id. Some courts may also considering appointing their own expert under FED. R.
EVID. 706 to independently evaluate the demonstrative computer simulation.
112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id. See infra Part III.C.
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programs were reliable and performed calculations accurately;115 5) the “chain of
custody” of all parts of the demonstrative computer simulation;116 6) the reliability of
the software and hardware;117 and 7) emphasis that the computer is simply making
quick and speedy mathematical calculations based on the information relayed by
other parties.118
Finally, even though the substantive expert may not have personally prepared the
simulation, the substantive expert must still be familiar with the workings, concepts
and information used in the demonstrative computer simulation, and be prepared to
explain them in understandable terms to both the bench and jury.119 If the
substantive expert has not been properly prepared on these concepts, the advocate
risks the inadmissibility of the demonstrative computer simulation.120 The
substantive expert would be unable to testify if the demonstrative computer
simulation would “fairly and accurately” represent his testimony, and if the computer
simulation would “assist the expert is testifying.”121
C. GIGO - Garbage in, Garbage Out
Computer systems do not think on their own; they simply respond to the
instruction and information given by humans.122 If this information and/or
instruction is faulty, the end result of any computer process would be inaccurate.123
For example, on January 15, 1990, the AT&T long-distance network collapsed for a
nine hour period, due to a faulty instruction given to the computer by a person.124 If
an incorrect computer instruction can create this type of chaos, how much damage
can an undetected incorrect computer instruction do in the criminal courtroom?
Reliability of the demonstrative computer simulation is required for
admissibility.125 Several factors determine the reliability of the simulation: 1) the
115

Id. James T. Wentzel, the crime scene reconstructionist for the Cuyahoga County
Coroner’s Office in Clark, now calibrates his hardware and software as a validation of
reliability. Public Interview with James T. Wentzel (Feb. 4, 1998).
116
Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54-55. Testimony would be proper regarding who
has had access to either the source data, computer software or hardware, and results of the
simulation.
117

Id.

118

Id. Therefore, the computer simulation is simply demonstrating the testimony of the
substantive expert witness.
119
David Weinberg, Animation in the Court: Scientific Evidence or Mickey Mouse?, 34
No. 2 JUDGES’ J. 11, 13 (1995).
120

In re Chartiers Valley School District, 447 A.2d 317 (Pa. 1982).

121

See supra, note 28, for discussion on the “magic words.”

122

See supra, notes 48-49 and accompanying text for discussion regarding GIGO.

123

Mario Borelli, The Computer as Advocate: An Approach to Computer-Generated
Display in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L. J. 439, 450-51 (1996).
124

Garcia, supra note 105, at 1077.

125

See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) for the Supreme Court’s most recent
discussion regarding reliability of evidence.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

13

524

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:511

hardware (equipment);126 2) the software (instructions);127 3) the manner in which the
information was entered into the computer;128 4) the presence or absence of quality
control over the process;129 and 5) the presence or absence of a security system
within the computer.130
Based on the GIGO principle, a knowledgeable attorney could challenge the
reliability of the demonstrative computer simulation. Even commercial software is
subject to inaccuracies, so all portions of the production of the computer simulation
should be considered.131 However, the qualification of the input data is both the most
important and the most vulnerable.132 An effective attorney will be wise to doublecheck each piece of information input into the simulation software.133 Spot-checks
should be performed on the output of the process to verify and validate the entire
process.134
Additionally, the theories used to process and formulate the computer simulation
require close scrutiny.135 The computer programs require large amounts of source
information to produce an accurate simulation.136 If inadequate information is
available, extrapolation or speculation of the information may be performed to
produce the data necessary to run the program.137 However, such information is not
factual; rather, it is an educated guess, and will distort the actual event.138
126

Dennis A. Estis et al., Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, CONSTRUCTION
LAW, August 1994, at 42.
127

Id.

128

Id. For example, in an accident reconstruction scenario, information would need to be
gathered, entered, and verified from eyewitnesses, photographs, scene visits, highway maps,
and topographical surveys. Kristin L. Fulcher, The Jury As Witness: Forensic Computer
Animation Transports Jurors to the Scene of a Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 55, 74 (1996). If just one piece of this information is inaccurate, it can skew the entire
results of the demonstrative computer simulation . . . resulting in an inaccurate video display
of the incident to the jury. Id.
129

Estis et al., supra note 126, at 42.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

David W. Muir, Debunking the Myths About Computer Animation, 444 PLI/LIT591,
602 (1992).
133
Id. The dissent in Clark noted that the crime scene reconstructionist did not validate the
information given to him, that “he neither visited this crime scene nor personally took any of
the measurements used in the analysis.” State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 818 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995).
134

Muir, supra note 132, at 602. This source contains a good, detailed explanation of
validating the input data.
135

I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More Caution and New Approach
are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36, 41 (1995).
136

Id.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 41-42.
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D. Admissibility
The admissibility of computer simulations continues to provide confusion for
both the bench and bar.139 Some view the computer simulation as substantive
evidence, and subject the simulation to rigorous substantive admissibility
requirements.140 Others view the computer simulation as demonstrative evidence,
and subject the evidence to the more relaxed admissibility requirements for
demonstrative evidence.141
First, to admit demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert testimony,
the experts themselves must be qualified to testify.142 Under Federal Rules of
139

MAUET, supra note 8, at 165-67. A review of the current literature also shows
continuing confusion over the true role of computer simulation. Due to this confusion, the
wise litigator will be aware of the issues and arguments concerning both substantive and
demonstrative computer simulations.
140

As substantive evidence, the computer simulation is admitted as an exhibit, the
attorneys can use it during closing arguments, and the jury can use it during deliberations. Id.
For substantive evidence, the computer simulation itself must have independent probative
value, add new facts to the case, and meet substantive evidentiary standards. Chatterjee, supra
note 135, at 38. As such, the computer simulation itself is subjected to the requirements of
FED. R. EVID. 702, and would come under the jurisdictional scrutiny of the Frye/Daubert type
evaluation. Id. In one case, the computer simulation was offered for substantive evidence, but
failed a Daubert evaluation. Robinson v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th
Cir. 1994). However, the court still permitted the simulation to be introduced as illustrative
evidence. Id. at 1086-91. For additional information regarding the use of computer
simulations as substantive evidence, see I. Neel Chatterjee, Admitting Computer Animations:
More Caution and New Approach are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995); Edward A.
Hannon, Computer-Generated Evidence: Testing the Envelope, 63 DEF. COUNS. J. 353 (1996);
John Selbak, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of Computer-Generated Animation in
the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L. J. 337 (1994).
141
As computers have no independent thought process and totally reflect the thought of
humans, it is more proper to use the computer simulation as demonstrative evidence.
Demonstrative evidence is not admitted into evidence, and is usually not permitted in the
deliberation room. See supra, Part II.A. However, by illustrating the expert’s testimony with
computer simulation, the visual conceptualization of the expert’s testimony is shown to the
jury, and carried mentally by the jury themselves back into the deliberation room.
142
See supra, Part III.B. As previously mentioned, the Federal Rules of Evidence are used
throughout this practitioner's guide. However, even for those jurisdictions which have not
adopted the Federal Rules, the discussions contained here are valuable in handling
demonstrative computer evidence.
The Federal Rules of Evidence echo the Daubert standard, based upon Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which concluded that the judge serves as
gatekeeper for the admissibility of scientific testimony, relevancy being based upon not
whether or not the judge favored or disfavored the scientific conclusion, but rather if there are
good grounds for the scientific conclusion, the testimony is admissible, and the jury is to
determine the weight and credibility of the scientific testimony. Id. at 592, 597. Daubert
contains the "four horsemen," that is, four factors which judges can consider in determining
the reliability and hence the admissibility of the proffered scientific evidence: 1) whether the
theory employed by the expert is generally accepted in the scientific community; 2) whether
the theory has been subjected to peer review activities and publication; 3) whether the theory
can be and has been tested; and 4) whether the known or potential error rate of the tests is
acceptable. The expert's bare conclusions, without more, are not enough; rather, the expert's

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998

15

526

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:511

Evidence 702, the expert’s opinions may be scrutinized for reliability and relevancy,
using a Daubert test for scientific testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence 401/403
relevancy/balancing tests work together with the Daubert test contained in 702 to
insure the quality of the evidence placed before the jury.
The purpose of demonstrative computer simulation is simply to make an expert’s
testimony more understandable, or to provide background material to accomplish the
same effect.143 Therefore, to admit the demonstrative simulation, the only required
foundation is the expert’s testimony that the animation fairly and accurately
illustrates the expert’s opinion and is helpful for the expert to explain the testimony
to the jury.144
To authenticate the demonstrative simulation, both the source information and
the computer process used to create the simulation are subject to scrutiny for
reliability.145 As discussed earlier, both the substantive expert and the computer
expert will need to demonstrate the reliability of the underlying data, formulae or
theories, etc.146 Additionally, the system should be authenticated to show accurate
results, and reliability of the processes.147 Once this foundational requirement is met,
the demonstrative computer simulation can be considered to illustrate the expert’s
testimony.
The importance of establishing the reliability of both the underlying data and
theories, as well as the operation of the computer system, can not be taken lightly.
For evidence to be placed before the jury, reliability of the evidence is required. A
criminal defendant may counter that his constitutionally protected Fifth
Amendment148 due process right to mount his own defense will permit the use of
evidence which may seem reliable in the lay setting, but has not been deemed
reliable de jure. However, in a recent Supreme Court decision,149 the Court held that
conclusions must be founded on sound science, requiring objective, independent evaluation of
the expert's work. Id. at 593-97.
Prior to the Daubert standard, the Federal Rules were based on the Frye standard, named
aptly for Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923). Some state jurisdictions still
utilize the Frye standard, which held that evidence which was not based on generally accepted
principles in the scientific community was inadmissible, therefore not permitting the
admission of new or novel scientific theories. Id. at 1014.
143

Hannan, supra note 109, at 360.

144

MAUET, supra note 8, at 166. In People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. 1984),
(discussed supra, note 80), the court articulated that the demonstrative computer simulation
was admittable upon qualification of the expert if the computer simulation: 1) was relevant, 2)
fairly and accurately reflected the oral testimony, and 3) could aid the jury in understanding
the testimony. Id. at 722.
145

Weinberg, supra note 119, at 12.

146

See supra, Part III.B.

147

Weinberg, supra note 119, at 13. FED. R. EVID. 901 will permit authentication by
showing the computer produces accurate results, by demonstrating that commercially
available equipment and software was used, or by judicial notice. Id. For sample foundational
questions specifically developed for computer simulations, see Gail Donoghue, Computer
Generated Exhibits, 553 PLI/LIT 509, 524-25 (1996).
148

U.S. CONST. amend V.

149

United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) .
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the criminal defendant must establish reliability of his defense evidence, and that
unreliable evidence has no place before a jury in the criminal courtroom.150
Therefore, the establishment of the reliability of demonstrative computer simulation
to illustrate expert testimony is a crucial phase, and should be give full and proper
weight in preparation for trial.
E. Additional Evidentiary Issues
1. Discovery
An expert’s testimony illustrated by computer simulation will contain many
complex data, theories, and calculations, and take considerable time by the
opposition to study and prepare.151 However, all that is required under criminal
discovery rules is the pre-trial disclosure of a summary of the expert’s intended
testimony.152 The civil discovery rules are more liberal, requiring the disclosure of
“data or other information considered by the witness”153 and notification of any
“exhibits to be used as a summary.”154 Neither rule explicitly requires advance
notification and production of the computer simulation, or its chief components.
In the civil context, early case law did not require opposing counsel to supply the
underlying data and theorems of the computer simulation in advance of trial.155
However, subsequent cases have required the timely pre-trial disclosure of
information regarding the use of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate
expert testimony, and have excluded the expert’s testimony when timely pre-trial
disclosure was not given.156
Beyond the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protection of Rule 26, civil litigants
may also be able to obtain access to the computer simulation information through
150

Id.

151

Barrish, supra note 71, at 712.

152

FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a) (1) (E). The rule requires the defendant to comply with a
reciprocal request by the government after the government has provided the defense with the
defendant’s discovery request. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (b) (1).
153

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (a) (2) (B).

154

Id.

155

Perma Research v. Singer Company, 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976). Although Perma
refused to disclose the details to Singer, the trial judge still allowed the expert to testify. The
appellate court did not find an abuse of discretion by the trial judge, as “Singer has not shown
that it did not have an adequate basis on which to cross-examine the plaintiff’s experts.” Id. at
115.
156

See Mississippi PSC v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 358 So. 2d 418 (Miss. 1978);
Richardson v. State Highway & Transportation Commission, 863 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1993);
Ladeburg v. Ray, 508 N.W.2d 694 (Iowa 1993). In City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1980), the court concluded that a
“discovering party not only must be given access to the data that represents the computer’s
‘work product,’ but he also must see the data put into the computer, the programs used to
manipulate the data and produce the conclusions, and the theory or logic employed by those
who planned and executed the experiment.” Id. at 1266-67 (citing 8 WRIGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2218).
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other avenues. The issuance of a subpoena duces tecum and request for production
will facilitate the obtainment of this information.157 Very specific interrogatories
may also lead to additional information.
The attorney can also use the protective order provided by Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 26(c) to require enough advance notice and information to adequately
prepare,158 to require that the opposing party’s obligation to supplement discovery
include any demonstrative computer simulation,159 and to limit disclosure in order to
protect any proprietary information of the expert.160 Using a motion in limine for a
pre-trial hearing may be useful in determining the jurisdictional boundaries of this
disclosure.161
However, the criminal defendant does not have at his disposal the discovery tools
available to the civil litigant. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 16 allows for limited
discovery, but it does not allow depositions or interrogatories of the experts who will
be testifying with the computer simulation.162 The criminal defendant must look to
the court’s interpretations of the Constitution for his protection. Under the Due
Process clause, the government must disclose any information in its possession that
is favorable to the defense and material to guilt or punishment, including information
that is exculpatory or that can be used to impeach a witness.163 This would apply
equally to information regarding a computer simulation.164
The criminal defendant also has a protected constitutional right to confront his
accusers.165 Inherent in the right of confrontation is the right to cross-examine the
witness.166 However, improper pre-trial discovery of the expert’s testimony and the
accompanying complex computer simulation information would render the crossexamination of the expert incomplete at best.167 Yet, to date there is no clear,
brightline rule allowing for the pre-trial discovery of demonstrative computer
simulations.168
157

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b) (1); FED. R. CIV. P. 33; Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54.

158

Brain & Broderick, supra note 17, at 54.

159

Id.

160

Pozin, supra note 111, at 44.

161

Edward V. Filardi & Dimitrios T. Drivas, The Presentation of Demonstrative and
Visual Evidence At Trial, 299 PLI/PAT 245, 250 (1990). The attorney may also start with the
voir dire challenge of the opposing expert . . . remember, no expert, no demonstrative
computer simulation. Id.
162

Edward J. Bardelli, The Use of Computer Simulations in Criminal Prosecutions, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 1357, 1374-75 (1994).
163

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

164

Garcia, supra note 105, at 1132.

165

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

166

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 66 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting).

167

Garcia, supra note 105, at 1137-38.

168

The issue in Ritchie was: Does the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine entail the
right to obtain discovery before trial of any and all information in a confidential file that might
be useful to contradict or to impeach unfavorable testimony at trial, or to prepare for trial?
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2. Hearsay
Upon introduction of demonstrative computer simulation to illustrate expert
testimony, opposing counsel is likely to stand and welcome the simulation with that
aggravating phrase: “Objection, hearsay.” However, a demonstrative computer
simulation is not hearsay, it is not an out of court statement offered for the truth of
the matter asserted.169 Rather, demonstrative computer simulation is offered to
illustrate the expert’s testimony; to assist the expert in the explanation and
clarification of his testimony to the jury.170 Since the computer simulation
demonstrates the expert’s testimony, the expert’s in-court statements are those
statements which are evaluated against the hearsay rules.171
In those jurisdictions which may still classify demonstrative computer simulation
as substantive evidence, Federal Rules of Evidence 803 (24) and 804 (b) (5) may
provide relief to the hearsay objection. These hearsay “catchall exceptions” give
courts discretionary authority to admit hearsay evidence, providing the court
determines that the evidence is reliable and trustworthy.172 However, the caveat is
that these exceptions require pre-trial notification to the opposing party.173
3. The 403 Balancing Test: Unfairly Prejudicial or Technology Backlash?
As this discussion is entitled “Seeing is Believing,”174 this old adage gains extra
weight when considering computer simulations that are produced for the jury.175
Computerization carries with it a public perception of precision and infallibility.176
The fear by opposing counsel is that the jury will think “I saw it on TV, so it must be
true,” without examining the validity of the expert’s own underlying testimony.177
Under Federal Rules of Evidence 403, the court can exclude evidence, regardless
of its authentication and relevance, “if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”178
Generally courts will admit demonstrative computer simulation if the simulation is
Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43. The plurality decision held that the Sixth Amendment does not
guarantee the right of pre-trial discovery. Id. at 61.
169

FED. R. EVID. 801.

170

Borelli, supra note 123, at 448.

171

Additionally, FED. R. EVID. 703 allows an expert to rely upon information not in
evidence in forming his testimonial opinion.
172

Marc A. Ellenbrogen, Lights, Camera, Action: Computer-Animated Evidence Gets Its
Day in Court, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1087, 1110-11 (1993).
173

See supra, Part III.E(1) for discussion on pre-trial discovery.

174

Racz v. R.T Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 4, 1994).
175

Borelli, supra note 123, at 455.

176

Id.

177

Murphy, supra note 93, at 158. The expert in Pierce described the effect as this: “All
eyes were glued to the” computer simulation. Fulcher, supra note 128, at 72.
178

FED. R. EVID. 403. To preserve the record for appeal, the simulation needs to be
included in the record.
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true to the expert’s testimony,179 is not unnecessarily inflammatory,180 and proper
pretrial notice has been forewarned to the opposition. The court places great faith in
the jury and their ability to adhere to the court’s instructions.181
However, there have been instances where courts have disallowed the use of
demonstrative computer simulation, citing the prejudicial effect foreseen by Federal
Rules of Evidence 403. It would be possible to boast the credibility of an expert’s
not-quite-firmly-grounded testimony by the mere method of using a demonstrative
computer simulation. Coupled with less knowledgeable opposing counsel, the
prejudicial effect can quickly outweigh the probative value of the expert’s testimony.
In one instance, the simulation was so effective that it made the judge uncomfortable,
and he was convinced that the simulation would remove from the jury the factfinding
role.182 In another case, the court determined that the computer simulation was not
sufficiently similar to the expert’s testimony to permit the simulation to be shown to
the jury.183 However, another court disapprovingly found that even though the
computer simulation was an adequate representation of the expert’s testimony,
counsel gave opposing counsel inadequate notice and time to prepare for
examination of the simulation.184 In each of these instances, Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 was cited as the authority to exclude the proposed demonstrative
computer simulation to illustrate the expert’s testimony.
The backlash in our society against over computerization can also lurk as a
potentially damaging prejudice on the contra side of the demonstrative computer
simulation.185 The use of the demonstrative computer simulation is supposed to aid
the jury in clarifying the expert’s complex testimony. However, in some instances,
other types of demonstrative evidence would be much more helpful to the jury in

179
In Robinson v. Missiori Pacific Railroad Co., 16 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 1984), the Tenth
Circuit ruled that in this matter with the limited illustrative use of computer simulation, there
is no resulting prejudice; provided that there is a cautionary instruction to the jury and an
opportunity for cross-examination of the expert. Evidence - Videotaped Animation Illustration of Expert’s Theory, 95 No. 5 FED. LITIGATOR 43 (1994).
180

In Pierce v. State, 671 So.2d 186 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 1996), even though the evidence
indicated a bloody scene with screaming children, the “computer animation videotape
demonstrated no blood and replicated no sound. Further, the mannequins used in the
computer animation . . . depicted no facial expressions.” Florida Appeals Court OK’s Use of
Computer Animation As Demonstrative Evidence in Criminal Trials, 1996 WL 259109. In
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stick figures. State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995).
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Hannon, supra note 109, at 358. One commentator concurs with the dissenting judge
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at 455.
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(1995).
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understanding the expert’s testimony.186 Where more simplified demonstrative
evidence is required, the excess use of computer simulation just for the sake of the
new technology187 can dilute the jury’s understanding of the expert testimony.188
Even when the technology is the proper media for the demonstrative illustration,
the jury can negatively react to the computer simulation. Jurors can be skeptical as
to lawyer-created evidence189 and may view a computer simulation in a skewed
light.190 One instance revealed that a jury recognized an intentional effort of an
emotional appeal191 and became angry with counsel for this intentional effort to bias
their verdict.192
4. Jury Instructions
The court can address the concerns of the parties by giving specific limiting
instructions.193 For effectiveness, the judge should instruct the jury when the
simulation is shown that the it is being used to illustrate the expert testimony.194
Additional clarification by the judge related to scale, size, and other similarities will
be helpful to proper use by the jury of the demonstrative computer simulation.195
IV. CONCLUSION
With the rapid growth of technology, an increased use of demonstrative computer
simulation to illustrate expert testimony in the courtroom is expected. The expert's
testimony is required for introduction of the demonstrative computer simulation
before the jury.196

186

In one example, an attorney was cross-examining a doctor regarding lung cancer
metastasization. Id. Rather than use the whiz-bang technology, the attorney had the doctor
hold up a grapefruit (representing the tumor) right next to his chest. Id. The grapefruit was
covered with Post-It notes, which represented the migrating cancer cells. Id. During the
cross-examination, the attorney pulled the Post-It notes off of the grapefruit, and stuck them
all over the doctor . . . demonstrating the migration of the cancer. Id.
187

In the technology world, this overuse of technology just for the sake of the technology
is known as “latest and greatest” or “bleeding edge;” the point being that the mere use of the
brand-new, hot-out-of-the-development-lab technology is more important than the intended
result itself.
188

McElhaney, supra note 185, at 75.

189

Id. Criminal defense attorney Gerald Messerman worries that the high costs of the
technology will make litigation increasingly undemocratic. Id.
190

Id.

191

Fredrick Lederer, supra note 2, at 42-44. The graphics in the simulation were encased
in tombstones. Id.
192

Id. What really could be more damaging to your case than to anger the jury against you?
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Fulcher, supra note 128, at 75.
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Id.
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Id.
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See supra, Part III.B.
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The prepared and tenacious litigator will become knowledgeable regarding the
terms, concepts, and processes involved in creating the computer simulation,197 as
demonstrative computer simulation carries additional evidentiary reliability
concerns. The “Garbage In, Garbage Out” principle of computing requires that the
underlying information and process used to produce the computer simulation be
critically reviewed and evaluated for accuracy and reliability.198 Effective counsel
should analyze and plan for (and against) the use of demonstrative computer
simulations, and assist the court in understanding these same technical terms,
concepts and processes. Failure of counsel to familiarize themselves with the
technology which results in the admission of unreliable computer simulations may
arise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel and ethical concerns.
Seeing may be believing.199 Effective counsel will ensure that only fair and
accurate illustrations of the expert’s testimony via demonstrative computer
simulations reach the jury. It is the responsibility of the court and counsel to ensure
the computer simulations which illustrate the expert’s testimony assist the jury in
their understanding, and do not unfairly prejudice their decision.

197

See supra, Part III.A.

198

See supra, Part III.C.
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Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, *5
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994).
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